Religion in Kurdistan

G.M.K Team

G.M.K Team
رد: Religion in Kurdistan

was in contact with both Muslim modernists and leading Kurdish nationalists and where he
became involved in attempts at popular education. In the Balkan War and World War I he
served as a commander of Kurdish militia troops, distinguishing himself incidentally by
saving Armenian families from the massacres of 1915. His dream was to educate his people
and lift them from the ignorance and backwardness in which they lived. The tariqats, in their
state then were to him part of that backwardness. The education he proposed was both
Islamic and scientific.
In the early 1920s Sa`id broke with the Kurdish nationalist movement, in which he had
belonged to the non-separatist wing, and devoted himself to writing his magnum opus Risalei
Nur (Treatise on the [Divine] Light). This is a series of texts of varying length on various
moral and religious subjects, based on dreams and visions, strongly mystical in tone, and
written in an idiosyncratic, old-fashioned Turkish. It became the sacred text of Sa`id's
increasing numbers of disciples, who came to be known as Nurjus, "Devotees of the [Divine]
Light." The Nurju movement, in spite of persecution by the state, kept growing in numbers
and has at present several million followers throughout Turkey, Turks as well as Kurds.25
The Nurjus constitute probably the most tolerant and open-minded of the various Sunni
Muslim movements in Turkey and have from the beginning distinguished themselves by their
positive attitude toward modem science. This is not to say that among the followers of so
large a movement there are not here and there fanatical groups. It is ironical, given Sa`id
Nursi's rejection of the sufi orders, that the Nurju movement has itself assumed some of the
structural characteristics of a tariqat, with a hierarchical organisation based on closeness to
the late master and degrees of initiation in the arcane secrets of the master's texts. I have even
met Nurjus among the Kurds who were also Naqshbandis.
There are at present several separate tendencies within the Nurju movement emerging out
of conflicting views on the political stand that the movement should adopt. Among the
Kurdish Nurjus a moderately nationalist tendency has emerged in the 1980s that names itself
after the Medreset-üz-Zahra, the university that Sa`id Nursi had dreamt of establishing in
25 0n Sa`id-i Nursi and his religious teachings, see Hamid Algar, "Said Nursi and the Risala-i Nur", in Islamic
Perspectives: Studies in Honor of Sayyid Abul A!a Mawdudi (London, 1978), pp. 313-333; Serif Mardin,
Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1989). On the Nurju movement see Paul Dumont "Disciples of the Light: The Nurju
Movement in Turkey," Central Asian Survey 5:2 (1986): 330. See also Rusen Çakır's observations in Ayet ve
slogan, pp. 77-99.​
 

G.M.K Team

G.M.K Team
رد: Religion in Kurdistan

Kurdistan. They emphasise Sa`id's role in the early Kurdish movement, which the official
Nurju spokesmen had long passed over in silence. This group appears to represent relatively
well-educated urban youth of Nurju family backgrounds. The emergence of Kurdish
nationalism in these Islamic circles is not an exceptional occurrence. We find a parallel
development in other Muslim groups among the Kurds, in spite of Islam's ideally nonnationalist
attitude.
Among the Iranian and Iraqi Kurds, Islamic political movements have never gained much
of a following. Immediately after the Iranian revolution, before political parties had got
themselves organised, religious personalities emerged as spokesmen for the Kurds. This was
no doubt in response to the role played by the Shiite ulama in and after the revolution and did
not reflect a sudden turn to religion. The most popular of these personalities was Ezzeddin
Hoseini of Mahabad, a religious functionary who spoke like a nationalist rather than like a
cleric, and who allied himself with the radical left. A more explicitly Islamic politician was
Ahmad Moftizadeh of Sanandaj, who sought co-operation with the relatively liberal Shiites
around Bani-Sadr.
Both men's positions were soon marginalised when the secular Democratic Party of
Kurdistan in Iran (KDP-I) and Komala consolidated themselves and organised the
population. Hoseini lost his initial mass support but not popular sympathy. With a small
personal following he took part in guerrilla action when the Iranian army and Revolutionary
Guards reoccupied Kurdistan. Since the mid-1980s he has lived in European exile.
Moftizadeh's fate was more tragic. He fell out first with the nationalist Kurds in his town,
who saw in him a stooge of Tehran, and then also with the Iranian authorities, who found him
insufficiently co-operative. He has languished in an Iranian prison for almost a decade at the
time of writing (1991). There is no significant Islamic organisation or tendency among the
Iranian Kurds now, and apparently no potential support for such a movement either.
As said before, Iran's post-revolutionary authorities have made various attempts to
establish Islamic organisations among the Iraqi Kurds, but these have not been very
successful. There have been small formations led by Abbas Shabak, a former Talabani
associate, and by Najib Barzinji, a less prominent member of the well-known shaikhly family,
both financed and armed by Iran; but neither ever amounted to much. The only significant
force is Shaikh Muhammad Khalid Barzani's Kurdish Hizbullah, who are held together by
traditional loyalties to the shaikh of Barzan rather than Islamic ideology. Although many Iraqi
Kurds are pious Muslims, Islam as such is not a rallying force.​
 

G.M.K Team

G.M.K Team
رد: Religion in Kurdistan

The situation seems different in Turkish Kurdistan. During the 1970s and 1980s the
National Salvation Party and its successor, the Welfare Party, both of them explicitly Islamic
political parties, consistently polled 20 per cent or more in the Kurdish provinces, which is
well above the national average. This does not necessarily mean that the same high
proportion of the Kurds has embraced Islamic political ideals. For one thing the pany
represents a distinct class interest, that of small-town traders and entrepreneurs who view
complete integration in the western economy as a vital threat. It is therefore only natural that
it receives stronger support in the more economically backward areas. Secondly, the party has
always refrained from the Turkish chauvinist attitude towards the Kurds that has
characterised almost all other political parties in Turkey. Moreover, Kurdish voting behaviour
is often more dependent upon patronage relations than upon ideological motivation. A vote
for the Welfare Party is not necessarily a deliberately Islamic vote, while conversely many
committed Muslims have voted for other parties. (Most of the Kurdish shaikhs, and also the
Nurjus, for instance, have allied themselves with other parties.)
Political commitment to Islam is most unambiguous among the supporters of clandestine
or semi-clandestine Islamist groups. Their clandestinity makes it difficult to find reliable
information about these groups. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, apparently under the
influence of the Iranian revolution, there was a short-lived group styling itself the Islamic
Liberation Army (IKO, slam Kurtulus Ordusu), with some supporters in the Tatvan and
Batman districts. Students of the schools for religious functionaries (imam-hatip liseleri,
state-run schools present in many Kurdish towns) formed informal networks of Islamist
radicals, into which they also drew many other urban youth. In the second half of the 1980s
these Islamist groups increasingly emphasised their Kurdish identity in opposition to the
Turkish military operations in Kurdistan. At several places the initially antagonistic relations
between the Islamist groups and the Marxist PKK (Workers' Party of Kurdistan), which has
carried on a full-blown guerrilla war since 1984, became quite cordial.
The major Islamist formation among Turkey's Kurds at present appears to be the Islamic
Party of Kurdistan (PIK, Partiya Islamiya Kurdistan). It is Kurdish nationalist as well as
Islamist —in fact, its party organ, Judi, writes more about the Kurds than about Islam — and
it enjoys some support in places like Batman (which is also a stronghold of the Welfare
Party) and in districts with a history of Sunni-Alevi confrontation such as Malatya. It is
unlikely that this party will play a role of importance in the near future, although some
articles in the Turkish press have attempted to present it as a dangerous militant​
 

G.M.K Team

G.M.K Team
رد: Religion in Kurdistan

organisation.26 Compared to secular parties such as the PKK or the other, much weaker,
leftist formations, the mobilising potential of the PIK remains quite low.
Conclusion: Islam and Nationalism
Islam was the factor that united Turks and Kurds in the aftermath of World War I against the
infidel victors and the local Christians (Armenians and Greeks). Many Kurds willingly took
part in the Kemalist movement because it was a movement of Muslims against non-Muslims.
When Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) dethroned Islam after the establishment of Republican
Turkey, he undermined the very foundation of Turkish-Kurdish unity. It is hard to disentangle
Kurdish and Islamic sentiment in the first rebellions against his regime, but attachment to
Islam in these rebellions took the form of attachment to an Islamic leader, usually a tariqat
shaikh.
And so it is today. The religiosity of the (Sunni) Kurds is most frequently expressed in
their loyalty to a shaikh. Modernist and fundamentalist currents in Islam have not made
serious progress among the Kurds. The one movement that began as modernist (be it of an
idiosyncratic kind), the Nurju movement, has become among the Kurds a tariqat-like
organisation. The Muslim Brethren and similar neo-fundamentalist movements never gained
influence among the Kurds, and the impact of Iran's revolutionary Muslim ideologists has
also been limited. The only important Iran-supported group among the Kurds is significantly
that of the Naqshbandi shaikh, Muhammad Khalid Barzani.
When the Turkish military took over in 1980, they perceived three dangers threatening the
Kemalist state: communism, Kurdish separatism and Islamic radicalism. Legalising and even
sponsoring moderate Islamic activities that had previously been banned seemed to them the
best way to fight the former two dangers and to prevent the radicalisation of the third.
Combined with severe repression of the left and the Kurdish nationalists, this policy did in
fact result in a general depoliticisation of society and a general turn to religion. The lasting
confrontation between the armed forces and the Kurds, however, and the physical repression
from which no Kurdish family remained exempt, caused a strong Kurdish nationalist
26 In March 1990 over thirty alleged members of the Partiya Islamiya Kurdistan were arrested
and a few arms were confiscated in police raids in Istanbul, Ankara and Malatya. The press
called the detainees "Islamist terrorists" and claims that the PIK had declared jihad ("holy​
 

G.M.K Team

G.M.K Team
رد: Religion in Kurdistan

backlash. While Muslim radicals of the early 1980s denied the relevance of ethnicity, most of
the Kurdish Islamists appear to have become nationalists as well. The nationalists, on the
other hand, including the PKK, have given up their earlier arrogant attitude toward Islam,
recognising it as an important, potentially progressive social force.
Further reading:
a. On religion among the Kurds in general:
Bois, Thomas. Connaissance des Kurdes. Beirut: Khayats, 1965. (Especially chapter VIII,
"Les Kurdes sous le Croissant," pp. 79-102).
Bruinessen, Martin van. "Religious Life in Diyarbekir: Religious Learning and the Role of
the Tariqats." In Martin van Bruinessen and H.E. Boeschoten, Evliya Çelebi in
Diyarbekir. Leiden: Brill,1988. Pp. 45-52.
Driver G. R. "The Religion of the Kurds." Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies 2 (1921-
23):197-213.
Nikitine, Basile. Les Kurdes: Etude sociologique et historique. Paris: Implimerie Nationale,
1956. (Especially chapter xi, "La vie spirituelle des Kurdes. Religion," pp. 207-54).
b. On Sunni Islam, the mystical orders and the Nurju movement:
Algar, Hamid. "The Naqshbandi Order: A Preliminary Survey of Its History and
Significance." Studia Islamica 44 (1976):123-152.
Algar, Hamid. "Said Nursi and the Risala-i Nur." In: lslamic Perspectives: Studies in Honour
of Sayyid Abul Ala Mawdudi. London, 1978. pp. 313-333.
Bruinessen, Martin van. Agha, Shaikh and State: On the Social and Political Organization of
Kurdistan. Ph.D. thesis, University of Utrecht, 1978. Revised edition: London: Zed
Books, 1992. (Especially chapter IV, "Shaikhs: Mystics, Saints and Politicians.")
Hakim, Halkawt. "Mawlana Khalid et les pouvoirs." In Marc Gaborieau, A. Popovic and T.
Zarcone, eds. Naqshbandis: Historical Development and Present Situation of a
Muslim Mystical Order. Istanbul-Paris: Isis,1990. pp. 361-370.
war") with the aim of establishing an independent Kurdistan based on Islamic principles​
 

G.M.K Team

G.M.K Team
رد: Religion in Kurdistan

Hourani, Albert. "Shaikh Khalid and the Naqshbandi Order." In S. M. Stern, A. Hourani and
V. Brown, eds. Islamic Philosophy and the Classical Tradition. Oxford, 1972. Pp. 89-
103.
Mardin, Serif. Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of Bediüzzaman
Said Nursi. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989.
c. On the heterodox sects of Kurdistan in general:
Moosa, Matti. Extremist Shiites: The Ghulat Sects. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press,
1988.
Müller, Klaus E. Kulturhistorische Studien zur Genese pseudo-islamischer Sektengebilde in
Vorderasien. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag,1967.
d. On the Yezidis:
Ahmed, Sami Said. The Yazidis: Their Life and Beliefs. Miami: Field Research Projects
1975.
Drower, E. S. Peacock Angel: Being Some Account of Votaries of a Secret Cult and Their
Sanctuaries. London: Murray 1941.
Edmonds, Cecil J. A Pilgrimage to Lalish. London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1967.
Guest, John S. The Yezidis: A Study in Survival. London and New York: KPI, 1987.
Lescot, Roger. Enquête sur les Yezidis de Syrie et du Djebel Sindjar. Beirut, 1938. Reprint:
Beirut: Librairie du Liban/Institut Français de Damas 1975.
Menzel, Theodor. "Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der Jeziden." In: Hugo Grothe, Meine
Vorderasienexpedition 1906 und 1907. Vol. 1. Leipzig, 1911. pp. 89-211.
e. On the Kurdish Alevis:
Bumke, Peter J. "Kizilbas-Kurden in Dersim (Tunceli, Türkei): Marginalität und Häresie."
Anthropos 74 (1979): 530-548.
(Cumhuriyet, April 3, 1990).​
 
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